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TITLE II OF THE 1968 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT:
AN INDIAN BILL OF RIGHTS
ARTHUR LAZARUS, JR*
One hundred years after adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
forty-four years after all native-born American Indians were de-
clared to be citizens of the United States,' and eleven years after
the Constitution followed the flag overseas, 2 the Bill of Rights
finally came to Indian reservations.
Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act s provides, in substance,
that no Indian tribe in exercising its powers of local self-govern-
ment4 may engage in action, with certain important exceptions,
which the federal or state governments are prohibited from under-
taking by the first ten and fourteenth amendments to the Consti-
tution. Significantly, the legislative forerunner of Title II, as origin-
ally drafted, would have required that "any Indian tribe in exercising
its powers of local self-government shall be subject to [exactly]
the same limitations and restraints as those which are imposed on
the Government of the United States by the United States Consti-
tution."' 5  In response to testimony that such general language
could cause a host of legal and practical problems in the adminis-
tration of justice on Indian reservations, 6 and at the suggestion
Member, Strasser, Spiegelberg, Fried, Frank & Kampelman, Washington, D. C.;
A.B., Columbia University (1946); LL.B., Yale University (1949). Mr. Lazarus is Chair-
man of the American Bar Association Committee on Indian Affairs, and represents a
number of Indian tribes.
1. Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253, now codified In 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2) (1964).
Prior to the Citizenship Act of 1924, approximately two-thirds of the Indians of the United
States already had acquired citizenship by treaty or statute. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTEIOR,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 617-52"> (1958), derived from F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL IN-
DIAN LAW (G.P.O. 4th ed., 1945).
2. Reid v. Covert, 854 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361
U.S. 234 (1960).
3. Act of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303.
4. In section 201(2) of the 1968 Act, "powers of self-government" are defined to
mean and include "all governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legis-
lative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are
executed, including courts of Indian offenses; * * *."
5. S. 961 of the 89th Congress, reprinted in Hearings on S. 961 etc. Before the Sub-
committeie on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
6. Hearings at 16, 64-65, 130-131, and elsewhere. As summarized in STAFF OF SUBCOMM.
ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS ON THE CONSTITIUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 9 (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter cited as SUMMARY REPORT]:
The most serious objections to S. 961 took the form neither of objection
to the purposes of the bill nor quarrel with the sundry allegations of the
practice of [8ic] possibility of denial of rights by tribal governments. Instead,
as numerous witnesses pointed out, the peculiarities of the Indian's economic
338 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
of the Department of the Interior,7 the proposed legislation was
rewritten in order to select and specify the constitutional protections
American Indians were to possess in their relations with tribal
governments."
The idea that Congress in 1968 had to bring the Bill of Rights
to Indian reservations by statute, and that Congress could pick
and choose which constitutional safeguards to extend, is alien to
popular concepts of American jurisprudence. Before examining the
historical and legal precedents which led to this anomaly, a brief
review of how Title II compares with the first ten amendments
would seem in order.
Section 202(1) of the 1968 Civil Rights Act provides that no
Indian tribe shall "make or enforce any law prohibiting the free
exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition for a redress of grievances." This language, of course, is
taken virtually word for word from the first amendment, with the
omission of the clause prohibiting "establishment of religion."
Deletion of the establishment clause was deliberate, in recognition
of the theocratic nature of many tribal governments.10
Section 202 (2) paraphrases the fourth amendment by requiring
that Indian tribes shall not "violate the right of the people to be
and social condition, his customs, his beliefs, and his attitudes, raised serious
questions about the desirability of imposing upon Indian cultures the legal
forms and procedures to which other Americans had become long accustomed.
7. Hearings at 317-319.
8. SUMMARY REPORT at 25. The revised bill was introduced as S. 1843 of the 90th
Congress on May 23, 1967. 113 CoNG. REc. S 7214 (daily ed. May 23, 1967). S. 1843 sub-
sequently was combined with other bills affecting Indians under consideration by the Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights, and, as so amended, was favorably reported on De-
cember 6, 1967, by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. S. REP. No. 841, PROTECTiNG
THE RIGHTS OF THE AMFPICAN INciA,, 90th Cong., 1st Se~s. (1967) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT]. The Senate passed the bill by unanimous vote on December 7, 1967 (113
CONG. REc. S 18156 (daily ed. Dee. 7, 1967), but the House Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, to which S. 1843 was referred, took no action to move the legislation.
On March 8, 1968, Senator Sam J. Irvin, Jr., (D., N.C.), Chairman of the Sen-
ate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, offered the complete final text of S. 1843 as
an amendment to H.R. 2516, the House-passed civil rights bill, and, after some procedural
debate as to whether the proposal was germane under the cloture rule then in force, the
Senate approved the amendment by a vote of 81-0. 114 CoNG. REc. 8 2459 et seq. (daily
ed. March 8, 1968). A few days later, the Senate passed H.R. 2516, which was referred for
consideration back to the House of Representatives and ultimately was approved without
further amendment. 114 CONG. REc. H 2825-2826 (daily ed. April 10, 1968).
The story of how the Indian Bill of Rights, apparently blocked from passage on its
own merits in the House of Representatives, became law as part of the 1968 Civil Rights
Act is a subject worthy of the political scientist-a fascinating tale in the fine art of
legislative strategy.
9. An Indian tribe is defined in section 201(1) to mean "any tribe, band or other
group of Indians subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States and recognized as pos-
sessing powers of self-government."
10. Report of the Department of Justice on S. 1843, dated March 29, 1968, printed in
Hearings on H.R. 15419 and Related Bills Before the Suboomm. on Indian Affairs of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 26 (1968). (herein-
after cited as House Hearings], see Statement on H.R. 2516 by Congressman Ben Reifel
(R, S.D.)-the only member of Congress also enrolled as a member of an Indian tribe-
before the House Committee on Rules, published as an Extension of Remarks of Congress-
man Ray 3. Madden (D., Ind.) [hereinafter cited as Reifel Statement], 114 CONG. RMC.
E 2741-2742 (daily ed. April 4, 1968).
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secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unrea-
sonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized."
Perhaps mindful of the nineteenth century Sioux and Apache cam-
paigns, Congress in Title II did not restate the second amendment
right of the Indian people to keep and bear arms.
Sections 202 (3) - (5), inclusive, make applicable to Indian tribes
the restraints upon double jeopardy, self-incrimination and the taking
of private property without payment of just compensation respect-
ively, imposed upon the federal and state governments by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. The fifth amendment right to indict-
ment by a grand jury in capital cases, on the other hand, is omitted
in view of the limited criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts.
Section 202(6) provides that no Indian tribe shall "deny to any
person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to
be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." This language
is taken virtually word for word from the sixth amendment, with
the omission of the right to trial "by an impartial jury," which is
covered under section 202 (10), and the addition of the qualification
that an Indian criminal defendant in tribal court has a right to
counsel only "at his own expense." In commenting upon the latter
limitation on a civil right of growing prominence," the Justice
Department -explained: 12
The fact that this is a departure from recent United
States case law requiring free counsel for indigents does
not necessarily mean it is repugnant to modern judicial
standards when viewed in the context of Indian court prac-
tices. In most Indian tribes there is no organized bar associ-
ation. Thus, attorneys are not generally available to repre-
11. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. House Hearings at 26-27; see Remarks of Interior Department Solicitor Edward
Weinberg before the Indian Law Committee, Federal Bar Association 2-3 (Sept. 13, 1968)
(unpublished) :
I [I]f the right to professional counsel without charge were construed as
applicable to criminal proceedings in tribal courts, such courts would prac-
tically have to cease functioning because they have no bars of professional
lawyers associated with them from which they could appoint counsel to rep-
resent indigent defendants. Hence, the right to professional counsel guaran-
teed by the Indian Bill of Rights is conditional upon the defendant's pro-
viding such counsel for himself.
As a general rule, professional attorneys have not heretofore been permitted to prac-
tice in tribal courts. JusTicE, U.S. COMM. ON CrVIL RIoHTs REPORT No. 5 145 (1961) [here-
inafter cited as Crvi[L RIGHTS REPORT]. The regulation preventing attorneys from appear-
ing in Courts of Indian Offenses under the control of the Secretary of the Interior, how-
ever, was revoked on May 16, 1961. 25 C.F.R. § 11.9.
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sent defendants. In addition, the prosecution in tribal courts
is often informal and may be presented without the assistance
of professional attorneys. Finally, the tribal cases generally
deal with traditional and customary law where the expertise
of trained counsel is not essential.
Section 202 (7) ordains that Indian tribes shall not "require ex-
cessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual pun-
ishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense
any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term
of six months or a fine of $500, or both." The first part of this text
obviously is taken from the eighth amendment, while the latter
part essentially codifies existing practice under the various tribal
law and order codes. Section 202(9) carries over to Indian tribes
the prohibition in article I, section 10, against passage by Congress
of any bill of attainder or ex post facto law.
Section 202 (10) provides that no Indian tribe shall "deny to any
person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the
right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons."
This modification of the sixth amendment right to trial by a twelve-
man jury in criminal cases was deemed appropriate in light of the
relatively informal nature of tribal court proceedings, while the
omission of the seventh amendment right to a trial by jury in civil
cases at common law where the value in controversy exceeds $20
also permits continued flexibility in the tribal court systems.13
Secton 202 (8), reflecting the fourteenth amendment, directs that
no Indian tribe shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of its laws," and, reflecting the fifth amend-
ment, further directs that Indian tribes shall not "deprive any person
of liberty or property without due process of law." Section 203,
reflecting article I, section 9, provides that the "privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court
of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of
an Indian tribe." As the following discussion will show, sections
202 (8) and 203 undoubtedly will have a greater impact upon the
operations of tribal governments, and are more likely to be the
subject or basis of future litigation, than any of the other provisions
of Title II.
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
BEFORE TITLE II
From the earliest days of our Nation, Indian tribes have been
recognized, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, as "distinct,
13. House Hearings at 27.
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independent, political communities,' ' 14 and, as such, authorized
to exercise powers of local self-government. In a more recent
restatement of the controlling rule of law, the Supreme Court of
Arizona observed:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of
Indian tribal powers is marked by adherence to three
fundamental principles; (1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the
first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2)
Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power
of the United States and, in substance, terminates the ex-
ternal powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power
to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by
itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its
powers of local self-government. (3) These powers are sub-
ject to qualification by treaties and by express legislation
of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, full powers
of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and
in their duly constituted organs of government. 15
A striking affirmation of the foregoing principles in particular
relation to the Bill of Rights is found in the case of Talton v. Mayes,
163 U.S. 376 (1896). The question there presented was whether a
law of the Cherokee Nation authorizing a jury of five persons to
institute criminal proceedings violated the fifth amendment require-
ment of indictment by a grand jury. The Supreme Court held that
the fifth amendment applies only to the acts of the federal govern-
ment, that the sovereign powers of the Cherokee Nation, although
recognized by the United States, were not created by the United
States, and that the judicial authority of the Cherokees was, there-
fore, not subject to the limitations imposed by the fifth amendment.
The Talton holding actually stands only for the proposition that
a tribal government, absent any federal action, is not required to
grant Indians a remedial right - a right concerning the form and
manner in which the power of government is exercised - con-
ferred by the Constitution. 6 Left open by the holding, and never
decided by the Supreme Court, was whether a tribal government,
again absent any federal action, may deny its members a
fundamental right - an inviolable and personal liberty - under
the Constitution, such as freedom of religion.' 7 The lower federal
14. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
15. Beg ay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624, 627 (1950), quoting from F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK o FEDERAL INDiAN LAW, supra note 1 at 123; see Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux
Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 92-93 (8th Cir. 1956).
16. The Talton decision is correctly cited in The Edgewood, 279 F. 348 (3rd Cir. 1922),
In support of the principle that presentment by a grand jury is not a fundamental consti-
tutional right. See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903), and Soto v. United States,
273 F. 628, 633 (3rd Cir. 1921).
17. The flat prohibition against slavery in the thirteenth amendment has been held ap-
plicable to Indian tribes. In re Sah Quah, 81 F. 327 (D. Alas. 1886).
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courts, though, in a series of decisions withholding basic Bill of
Rights protections, eventually filled that gap.
In Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of Southern Ute Res., 249 F.2d
915 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958), for example,
the court ruled that the due process clause did not apply to the
acts of an Indian tribe in denying an individual Indian the benefits
of tribal membership. In Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge
Reservation, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932
(1959), the court ruled that neither the due process clause of the
fifth amendment nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment applied to the act of an Indian tribe in imposing a tax
only on non-members for the use of Indian trust lands. In Native
American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir.
1959), the court ruled in rejecting a first amendment attack
upon a criminal conviction under tribal law for the ritual use of
peyote.18
The First Amendment applies only to Congress. It limits
the powers of Congress to interfere with religious freedom
or religious worship. It is made applicable to the States
only by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus construed, the
First Amendment places limitations upon the action of Con-
gress and of the States. But as declared in the decisions
hereinbefore discussed, Indian tribes are not states. They
have a status higher than that of states. They are subordi-
nate and dependent nations possessed of all powers as such
only to the extent that they have expressly been required
to surrender them by the superior sovereign, the United
States. The Constitution is, of course, the supreme law of
the land, but it is nonetheless a part of the laws of the
United States. Under the philosophy of the decisions, it, as
any other law, is binding upon Indian nations only where
it expressly binds them, or is made binding by treaty or
some act of Congress. No provision in the Constitution makes
the First Amendment applicable to Indian nations nor is
there any law of Congress doing so.19
The doctrine that Indian tribes are not federal instrumentalities
for purposes of invoking the Bill of Rights or states within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment also has found expression
in the district courts. Thus in United States v. Seneca Nation of
18. Forty years ago, the validity of a State anti-peyote ordinance was upheld.
State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926). More recently, State prosecutions
of members of the Native American Church for the use or pbssession of peyote outside a
reservation uniformly have been dismissed on first amendment grounds. People v. Woody,
61 Cal.2d 889, 394 P.2d 813, 40, Cal. Rptr. 69, (1964) ; Arizona v. Attakal, Criminal Cause
No. 4098, Coconino Cty. (1960-) ; Colorado v. Pardeahtan, Criminal Action No. 9454, Den-
ver Cty. (1967) ; Texas v. Clark, Criminal Action No. 12, 879, Webb Cty. (1968).
19. 272 P.2d at 134-135. Ap stated by the court (272 F.2d at 132). the Native Ameri-
can Church case also involved a claim of illegal search and seizure under the fourth
amendment, but this argument is not discussed in the opinion.
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New York Indians, 274 F. 946 (W.D. N.Y. 1921), the court dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction a claim based upon the alleged unlawful
taking of private property by a tribal government. Glover v. United
States, 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Mont. 1963), held that a criminal defend-
ant in tribal court has no right to counsel under the sixth amend-
ment. A non-Indian doing business on, but evicted from, an Indian
reservation was denied protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment. United States v. Blackfeet Tribal Court, 244 F. Supp. 474
(D. Mont. 1965). And, in a frequently noted case, Toledo v. Pueblo
de Jemez, 20 a suit under the old Civil Rights Act, 8 U.S.C. §43, by a
Protestant minority, refused the right to build a church or use a
tribal cemetery, was dismissed on the ground that the conduct of
an Indian tribe is not State action.
Notwithstanding its firm foundation in legal and historical
precedents, however, the continuing vitality of the Talton rule was
by no means assured in this era of changing constitutional inter-
pretation. 21 The more often claimed violations of fundamental rights
were litigated, the more likely some court would find a rationale
for holding Indian tribes subject to the Bill of Rights - and finally
one did. In Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (1965), the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on the newly stated premise that
tribal courts "function in part as a federal agency," held that the
District Court had jurisdiction "in a habeas corpus proceeding to
inquire into the legality of the detention of an Indian pursuant to
an order of an Indian court." 22
The Colliflower decision required fancy judicial footwork.28
Although the ruling expressly was confined "to the courts of the
Fort Belknap reservation," 24 no meaningful difference really
exists between the Fort Belknap Tribal Court and, as one example,
the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court which the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit found not to be a federal instrumentality in Iron Crow
v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Res., 231 F.2d 89, 94-98
20. 119 F. Supp. 429 (D. N.M. 1954) ; see: 7 STAN. L. R v. 285 (1955) ; The Constitu-
tional Ri'ghts of the American Tribal Indian, 51 VA. L. REv. 121, 132 (1956) ; 51 IOwA L.
P1v. 654, 665 n. 79 (1966).
21. Actually, spadework for the burial of Talton already had started. In Elk v. Wilkins,
112 U.S. 94 (1884), a relatively contemporaneous case, the Supreme Court declared that:
"[G]eneral acts of Congress dld not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly
manifest an intention to include them." 112 U.S. at 100. The Supreme Court. though, re-
pudiated this statement from Elk in Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation,
362 U.S. 99 (1960) at 116, and, as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit observed, Elk v. Wilkins, "whatever Its present day significance, certainly does not
operate to remove 'Indians and their property interests' from the coverage of a general
statute." Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162, 165 n. 4 (D.D.C. 1961), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 928 (1961). The death of Elk clearly signaled the ultimate demise of Tatlon.
22. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 379 (9th Cir. 1965).
23. The opinion was both criticized (79 HAaRv. L. Pzv. 436 (1965)), and praised (26
MONT. L. Rzv. 235 (1965)).
24. Supra note 22, at 379.
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(1956) .25 Moreover, although passing reference was made to a pos-
sible distinction between fundamental and remedial rights under the
Constitution, 2 the Ninth Circuit established no standards for deter-
mining which constitutional restrictions should apply to tribal courts
and, indeed, affirmatively indicated that the fourteenth amendment
might not apply at all.27 What emerges from a close reading of
Colliflower, therefore, is not a cohesive new theory of constitutional
law, but rather the distinct impression that the Court of Appeals
found a gross injustice to have been perpetrated 28  and simply
decided to stop it. 29
In addition to judicial concern, Congress and the executive
agencies, and that fourth branch of government, the private foun-
dation, devoted ever-increasing attention through the 1960's to con-
trolling possible violations of constitutional rights in the operations
of Indian tribes. Whereas a Special Task Force on Indian Affairs
in 1961 recommended to the Secretary of the Interior only that tribes
be encouraged to protect civil liberties by their own ordinances,30
President Lyndon Johnson urged Congress in 1968 to enact a statu.
tory Indian Bill of Rights. 31 A Commission on the Rights, Liberties,
and Responsibilities of the American Indian, established by the Fund
for the Republic, in 1961 declared that the immunity of Indian gov-
ernments from Bill of Rights restraints jeopardizes "the very as-
sumptions on which our free society was established. '"3 2  Most
important, beginning in 1961 the Senate Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Rights began the public hearings 33 which ultimately led to
the inclusion of Title II in the 1968 Civil Rights Act.
25. To the same general effect with respect to the Navajo Tribal Court is Oliver v.
Udall, 306 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 908 (1963).
26. 342 F.2d at 379, referring to the so-called "Insular Cases": Hawaii v. Mankichi,
supra note 16; Downes v. Bldwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S.
138 (1904); and Talton v. Mayes. Whether the fundamental-remedial right distinction
established in the Insular Cases would be extended to cases involving tribal sovereignty is
questionable in view of the Supreme Court's statement with respect to the former that "it
Is our judgment that neither the cases nor their reasoning should be given any further
expansion." Reid v. Covert, supra note 2, at 14.
27. Supra note 22, at 379.
28. As stated by the court (342 F.2d at 370-371), the record seems clearly to support
Mrs. Colliflower's claim that she was not afforded the right to counsel, was not con-
fronted by any witnesses against her and, for all practical purposes, was not afforded any
trial.
29. The district court, on remand, took the hint. Citing only the court of appeals de-
cision as authority, and after a brief statement of the facts, Judge Jameson concluded
"that there was a lack of due process under the fifth amendment," granted petitioner's
motion for summary judgment, and discharged Mrs. Colliflower from custody. Colliflower
v. Garland, Civil No. 2414 (D. Mont., Aug. 19, 1965).
30. Report to the Secretary of the Interior by the Task Force on Indian Affairs 31-32
(July 10, 1961).
31. House Hearings at 24.
32. COMM. ON THE RIGHTS, LIRBSTIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AMERIcAN INDIAN,
A PROGRAM FOR INDIAN CITIZENS 24 (1961), expanded and restated in W. BROPHY & S.
ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERIcA'S UNFINISHED BusINEss 44 (1966).
33. The complete history of these hearings is summarized in the SENATE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 5, as follows:
In 1961, the subcommittee began its preliminary investigation of the legal
status of the Indian in America and the problems Indians encounter when as-
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TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS-
AN ATTEMPTED RECONCILIATION
In their relations with the federal and state governments,
Indians are entitled to the same rights, privileges and immunities
as any other citizens.3 4 As the cases previously cited would indicate,
however, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights con-
firmed during the course of its hearings that Indians in their rela-
tions with tribal governments are not always accorded those same
rights, privileges and immunities35-a situation the Subcommittee
members found intolerable. Congress, unlike the courts, had clear-
cut authority to make constitutional protections applicable to Indian
tribes,3 6 and the ultimate question presented to the Subcommittee,
therefore, was not whether to act, but rather how far and how
fast to proceed. Consistent with the long history of dealings between
the United States and Indian tribes, any extension of the Bill of
Rights to Indian reservations, in order to become practically as
well as legally effective, would require agreement from the Indians,
and such consent in turn required respect for tribal sovereignty.
For Indians, tribal sovereignty is not an abstract concept, a
cultural relic, or even a vanishing institution. On their reservations,
serting constitutional rights in their relations with State, Federal, and tribal
governments. Approximately 2,000 questionnaires, addressed to a broadly re-
presentative group of persons familiar with Indian Affairs, comprised an
important segment of this investigation. The preliminary research, the first
such study ever undertaken by Congress, demonstrated a clear need for fur-
ther congressional Inquiry. Accordingly, hearings were commenced In Wash-
ington in August 1961, and moved to California, Arizona, and New Mexico in
November. The following June, hearings were held In Colorado and North and
South Dakota and finally concluded in Washington during March of 1963.
These hearings and staff conferences were held in areas where the sub-com-
mittee could receive the views of the largest number of Indian tribes. During
this period, representatives from 85 tribes appeared before the subcommittee.
S. 961 through S. 968 and Joint Resolution 40 of the 89th Congress were
introduced in response to the findings of the subcommittee based on these
hearings and Investigations.
On June 22, 23, 24, and 29, 1965, the subcommittee, meeting in Washing-
ton, received testimony relative to these measures. Additional statements
were filed with the subcommittee before and following the public hearings.
In all, some 79 persons either appeared before the subcommittee or presented
statements for Its consideration. These persons included representatives from
36 separate tribes, bands or other groups of Indians located in 14 States. Four
national associations representing Indians, as well as three regional', federat-
ed 'Indian organizations, presented their views. Members of Congress, State
officials, and representatives from the Department of the Interior also sub-
mitted opinions on this legislation.
The 1965 hearings revealed the necessity of revising some of the orginal
measures, combining two of them Into title I, and deleting two proposals from
the legislative package. The six titles of S. 1843, as amended, are products of
the recommendations of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights as report-
ed in its 'Summary Report of Hearings and Investigations on the Constitution-
al Rights of the American Indian, 1966'.
34. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Montoya v. Bolack, 70 N.M. 196, 372 P.2d 387 (1962)
Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P.2d 456 (1948) ; SENATE REPORT at 7; CuriL RIGHTS
REPORT, 8upra note 12, at 131-132, 160.
35. SENATE RIPonR at 6-9; SUMMARY REPRT, 8upra note 6, at 3.
36. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FED-
ERAIl INDIAN L&w 24-33 (1958) ; see cases cited supra note 15.
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the tribe represents to its members not only the local government,8 '
but also a dominant force in their economic and social lives. Indeed,
in 1934, after pursuing a contrary policy for generations, Congress
itself recognized that strong, independent tribal organizations are
fundamental to reservation development (for humans as well as
natural resources), and granted to the tribes new powers in the
management of their political and business affairs.3 8 Moreover,
through the years, tribal institutions, including the tribal courts,
though handicapped by lack of funds and experience,3 9 have worked
unusually well in protecting the rights and promoting the interests
of the Indian people. Small wonder, therefore, that Indians could
be expected to resist any change in the law, no matter how attractive
otherwise, which threatened the underlying powers or independence
of tribal governments.
The legislative history of Title II makes clear that Congress
viewed extension of the Bill of Rights to Indian reservations as a
tool for strengthening tribal institutions and organizations, not as
a weapon for their destruction. 40 The omission of the first amend-
37. Congress has shifted Jurisdiction over major crimes, such as murder, manslaughter,
rape, arson, burglary, etc., from the tribal courts to the federal district courts by statute
(18 U.S.C. §1153), but the tribal courts retain Jurisdiction over lesser offenses and, gen-
erally, in civil actions between Indians. The scope of tribal self-government is summarized
in U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL ITNDIA LAW 395 (1958) as including the powers
to define conditions of tribal membership, to regulate domestic re-
lations of members, to prescribe rules of inheritance, to levy taxes, to regulate
property within the jurisdiction of the tribe, to control the conduct of mem-
bers by municipal legislation, and to administer justice.
38. Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. §461-79 (1964).
39. SU MMAY REPORT, at 24: "These denials [of constitutional rights] occur, it is also
apparent, not from malice or Ill will, or from a desire to do injustice, but from the tribal
judges' inexperience, lack of training, and unfamiliarity with the traditions and forms of
the American legal system." CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, at 146: "Indian courts are said to rend-
er a good brand of justice except, perhaps, where offenders require treatment rather than
punishment, as in the case of many juvenile delinquents and some adults. Most Indian
courts have neither the personnel nor the resources to cope with offenders of this sort."
Report to the Secretary of the Interior by the Task Force on Indian Affairs 28 (July 10,
1961)
The size and effectiveness of local forces of law and order are highly
variable. Thus, the Navajos have a tribal court with seven judges, spend
more than $1 million in tribal funds annually for law and order activities,
equip their Indian police force with squad cars and two-way radios, and
have built modern and well-equipped jails which would be the envy of many
county sheriffEs. But, at the other end of the scale, there are tribal courts
established in Indian country where, due to inadequate tribal funds, there is
only one Judge, untrained, no police force, and an outworn building for deten-
tion purposes.
40. House Hearings, 8upra note 10, at 26; Reifel Statement, supra note 10; Remarks
of Edward Weinberg, &upra note 12, at 2, in describing the Interior Department's "selec-
tive" approach, which the Subcommittee adopted: "we were concerned that certain of the
limitations placed bty the Constitution upon the powers of the Federal Government, if im-
posed upon tribal government$, would be disruptive of those governments out of all pro-
portion to the protection they would afford individuals." See W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE, THE
INDIAx: AMERICA'S UNFINISnED BusINEss 44 (1966), and recommendations in the Report
to the Secretary of the Interior bry the Task Force on Indian Affairs 31 (July 10, 1961):
The Task Force is guided in thinking by the conviction that the protec-
tion of life and property, the preservation of civil rights, and the develop-
ment of clearly defined civil and criminal codes is essential to rapid eco-
nomic growth in the Indian country, and this, in turn, is fundamental to the
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ment establishment clause, in deference to the theocratic nature
of some Indian tribal governments, and the limitations placed upon
a criminal defendant's right to counsel, in deference to the un-
manageable administrative burdens an absolute right to counsel!
would place upon tribal court systems, already have been mentioned.
In addition, although the Subcommittee staff urgently recommended
in 1966 that individual Indians be granted a right of appeal from
an adverse decision in a tribal court and a trial de novo in the
federal district court in criminal cases where a denial of constitu-
tional rights may have occurred,4 1 and although the bill which
ultimately became Title II contained such language when originally
introduced in 1967,42 the appellate provisions of the legislation were
completely eliminated before S. 1843 was reported by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary.43 Again, the Subcommittee agreed to
delete a proposed new legal safeguard - even one strongly endorsed
by its Chairman44--on the ground that an appeal and trial.
de novo in federal court would cause too serious a disruption of
tribal self-government.
A Congressional intent to preserve tribal sovereignty under the
1968 Civil Rights Act is vividly illustrated by the provisions of
Title IV. In 1953, when the most serious effort in modern times to
terminate the special relationship between the federal government
and Indian tribes was reaching its peak, Congress passed an act45
which authorized a number of western states, not previously pos-
sessed of that right, unilaterally to amend their constitutions or
statutes in order to extend state civil or criminal jurisdiction over
Indian reservations and, in effect, to wipe out tribal jurisdiction. In
response to fifteen years of Indian protests against this ever-present
threat to their powers of local self-government, Title IV amends
the 1953 Act to require "the consent of the Indian tribe occupying
the particular Indian country or part thereof which could be affected
by such assumption" before any extension of state jurisdiction
would become operative.
The legal background, legislative history and actual text of the
1968 Civil Rights Act thus show that Congress there intended af-
firmatively and sensitively to reconcile application of the Bill of
Rights on Indian reservations with continued control by Indians over
rapid rise of the standard of living on the reservations which is necessary to
Indian well-being.
For the view that Title II weakened tribal sovereignty, on the other hand, see The Indian:
The Forgotten American, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1818, 1822 (1968).
41. SUMMARY REPORT at 25-26.
42. S. 1843 of the 90th Congress, reprinted at 113 CoNe. REc. S 7214 (daily ed. May 23,
1967).
43. SENATE REPORT at 1-2, 14.
44. SUMMARY REPORT at 13-14; Hearings, supra note 5, at 91.
45. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1964), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1964).
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their own affairs. 6 In attempting this reconciliation, Congress
undertook to solve a legal problem which, realistically, the courts
appeared ill-equipped to handle. Specifically, given current trends
of judicial decision, the exclusion of reservation Indians from the
enjoyment of many rights conferred by the Constitution was not
likely much longer to endure. At the same time, however, applying
every limitation in the Bill of Rights to the acts of Indian tribes
could destroy tribal self-government, while the economic and social
advancement of reservation Indians clearly is tied to the mainten-
ance of strong tribal institutions. In a way which the courts might
not have found possible, Congress in the 1968 Civil Rights Act sought
to balance these interests - freedom for the individual, yet respect
for tribal sovereignty. The measure of its initial success is evident
in the almost unanimous support which Indians gave Title II, not-
withstanding the trepidation with which they had viewed earlier
versions of the same legislation.
4 7
FUTURE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE II
Title II has not yet been judicially construed.48 As in the case
of constitutional rights generally, the Indian Bill of Rights presents
a limitless potential for litigation. Even in the absence of guiding
precedents, however, some conclusions reasonably may be reached
in answer to the two key questions: how far do the rights created
by the statute extend,4 9 and in what court can those rights be
enforced?
46. C r L RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 12, at 133: "Whether and to what extent such
limitations [Bill of Rights restraints] are desirable involves (as in so many Indian af-
fairs) a delicate balancing of values--between civil rights and liberties on the one hand,
and the benefits of tribal autonomy on the other." Compare 51 VA. L. REv. 121 at 135
(1965).
47. Endorsements of S. 1843 by numerous Indian tribes and Indian-interest organiza-
tions appear at 113 CONG. REc. S 18157 et seq. (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1967). In the final stages
of the legislative process, only the more traditional Pueblo groups in New Mexico actually
objected to Title II. House Hearings at 37 et seq.; Reifel Statement, supra note 10, at
E 2742. By contrast, representatives of many tribes opposed predecessor bills during the
1965 hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Conlstitutional Rights. Hearings, supra note
5, passn.
48. At least two cases have been instituted under the 1968 Act, one in the federal dis-
trict court in Arizona to upset the eviction of the head of the OEO-supported Navajo legal
service from the Navajo Reservation, and the second in the federal district court in Mon-
tana to change Practices in the Blackfeet Tribal Court, but neither had progressed to final
decision as of the date of this writing; in the former cape, Judge Walter E. Craig on De-
cember 16, 1968 did deny defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in part on
the basis of Title II, Dodge v. Nakal, Civ. No. 1209 Pet.
49. The proposition that Title II is "selective" in making Indian tribes subject to con-
stitutional restraints seems beyond dispute. SENATE REPORT at 10-11; SUMMaR.Y REPORT at
25; Remarks of Edward Weinberg, supra note 12, at 1-3; Vol. VII, No. 5 ALBUQUERQUE
L. J. 5-11 (1968) ; M. Price, The Civil Rights Act of 1968: An Analysis for Discussion,
Vol. 1, No. 4 Am. Indian L. Newsletter 4 (May 24, 1968). The issue which the courts must
face is what was selected in and what was selected out.
Significantly, Title III of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, under which the Secretary of
the Interior is directed to recommend to Congress "a model code to govern the administra-
tion of justice by courts of Indian offenses on Indian reservations," provides that such
code shall assure that a criminal defendant "shall have the same rights, privileges, and
immunities under the United States Constitution as would be guaranteed any citizen of the
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1. Forum: With respect to the review of criminal proceedings
in tribal courts, section 203 of Title II expressly provides that the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any
person, in a court of the United States, to test the "legality of his
detention" by order of an Indian tribe. Although the statute speaks
only in terms of "detention," the federal district courts in all likeli-
hood will (and should) extend their habeas corpus review of criminal
convictions in tribal courts to include cases where the defendant
is released on probation, which still involves restraint upon his
person, or where the defendant merely is fined, which usually is an
alternative to, or substitute for, actual imprisonment. 50 Further-
more, although the term "legality" is not defined, the only inter-
pretation of that word consistent with the purposes of the statute
would be that the federal district courts are authorized to inquire
into the question of whether a defendant's rights under section 202
may have been violated, but are not authorized to inquire into
whether he may have been denied some other right under either
the Constitution or tribal law. Even as so limited, section 203 provides
ample opportunity for the federal courts to insure that tribal
criminal proceedings are basically fair and that the constitutional
rights of Indian criminal defendants, as specified by Congress, are
fully protected.
Title II, of course, does not provide for an appeal to the federal
courts or other review of decisions by tribal courts in civil cases.
More important, the 1968 Act does not designate any court in which
the legality of tribal executive or legislative action, which allegedly
conflicts with the Bill of Rights, can be tested. In the absence of a
statutory direction, the choice of the appropriate forum for an ad-
judication of these rights is further complicated by the well-settled
rule that Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from suit, which
may not be waived without the consent of Congress.5 1
Where executive or legislative activities are subject to Secre-
tarial review - as frequently is the case under tribal constitutions,
particularly with respect to the management of trust lands and the
expenditure of trust funds - the Secretary of the Interior will have
the power, which an aggrieved party by appeal may request that he
invoke,52 to determine whether such tribal action is in accordance
United States being tried in a Federal court for any similar offense." Congress intended
a difference between the two titles of the 1968 Act. Unlike tribal courts, which are run by
the tribes, courts of Indian offenses are controlled by the Secretary. 25 C.F.R. §11.1.
50. See W. Canby & W. Cohen, The Professional Attorney and the Civil Rights Act,
Vol. 1, No. 28 Am. Indian L. Newsletter 7 (Dec. 16, 1968).
51. United States V. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940), and
cases therein cited; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 361 F.2d 517, 520
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966) ; Green v. Wilson, 331 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.
1964); Haile v. Satmooke, 246 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied sub nom. Haile V.
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 355 U.S. 893 (1957).
52. 25 C.F.R. §2.a.
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with Title II, and his determination can be reviewed in the federal
courts pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.53 Where tribal
executive or legislative activities are not subject to Secretarial re-
view, as generally is the case with respect to political affairs,
* the logical forum for testing the validity of such tribal action is the
tribal court.5 4 As noted above, however, no appeal is available to
the federal or state courts in the event the tribal court refuses to
take jurisdiction over the dispute.
Assuming the formidable sovereign immunity hurdle can be
overcome,5 5 a suit to enforce rights recognized and protected under
Title II probably will lie in the state court of general jurisdiction,
where the state possesses jurisdiction on Indian reservations in
accordance with Public Law 280 of the 83rd Congress, 5 and in the
federal district court, where the amount in controversy exceeds
$10,000. 5 7 The bulk of all civil cases arising on Indian reservations
in which a violation of section 202 rights is alleged, though, will not
fall within either of these categories. 58 The conclusion necessarily
follows that, at least in some classes of cases, Title II may have pro-
vided a right without an effective remedy.
2. Substantive Law: Passage of the 1968 Civil Rights Act un-
doubtedly has postponed the day when the Supreme Court must
decide whether Talton v. Mayes, supra, still is good law. 59 Assuming
(as the cases so far hold) that the principles of Talton and derivative
53. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-06 (Supp. II 1966). If the ordinance under attack has long pre-
viously been approved by the Secretary, laches may defeat an administrative or judicial
appeal. In such cases, an action for a declaratory judgment would seem more appropriate.
28 U.S.C. §2201 (1964). But see Oliver v. Udall, supra note 25.
54. Cf. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1969) ; Kain v. Wilson, -S.D.-, 161 N.W.2d 704
(1968).
55. See Remarks of Edward Weinberg, supra note 12, at 7: "This fact [tribal immunity
from suit] would not seem to pose any particular problem to a suitor because he seemingly
could proceed against the tribal officers responsible for the challenged action, as individ-
uals, under the familiar doctrine that the cloak of immunity does not cover officers whose
acts are beyond their authority." But see Green v. Wilson, supra note 51.
56. Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1964), 28 U.S.C. § 1360
(1964).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1331, (1964) granting jurisdiction to the District Courts where an issue
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Under the Act of
October 10, 1966, 80 Stat. 880, 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (Supp. II 1966), the jurisdictional amount
was dropped for suits involving a federal question brought by Indian tribes, but no such
waiver exists for suits by individual Indians.
58. Another potential statutory source for the review of tribal action in the light of
Title II is 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964), which provides in part:
The district courts shall have original Jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights ....
The 1968 Civil Rights Act clearly qualifies as a law "for the protection of civil rights,"
but Title II on its face does not authorize the filing of any civil action and, therefore,
the courts more probably than not will dismiss suits based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964)
alone for lack of jurisdiction.
59. If the Talton rule no longer Is valid, and the Bill of Rlights limits tribal action
under the Constitution absolutely, then enactment of Title II becomes a grand, but empty
gesture.
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decisions remain controlling, and thus that Congress has the power
to select which Bill of Rights protections shall apply to the acts of
Indian tribes, the central substantive issue that the courts now will
face is whether Title II should be strictly or liberally construed. The
historical and legal background of Title II, as well as the manifest
Congressional intent in the 1968 Act to preserve, if not enhance,
tribal sovereignty, all point to a strict construction of its language.
Section 202(6), for example, provides that a criminal defendant
in tribal court shall have the right "at his own expense" to have
the assistance of counsel for his defense. This right to counsel
logically extends to attorneys who are willing to serve at no cost to
the defendant because he is poor. The legislative history of Title II
makes clear, on the other hand, that the tribal court has no statutory
obligation to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant,60 and any
judicial extension of the right to counsel to impose such a burden
upon the tribal court would seem wholly unwarranted. 61 Similarly,
under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 2 a party
to a civil suit in tribal court apparently is not entitled as a matter
of right to the assistance of a professional attorney of his own
choice.
The requirements of section 202(8) that an Indian tribe not
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction6 3 the equal protection
of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due
process of law" pose more difficult problems of statutory inter-
pretations. Here again, in order to carry out the twin purposes of
the 1968 Act-protection for the individual, yet respect for tribal
sovereignty-the courts properly should exercise restraint before
striking down long-standing tribal practices which reasonably can
be justified. Thus, under Title II, a continuing violation of the "one
man, one vote" principle6 4 in a tribal election code probably could
and should be subject to judicial correction. The Iroquois custom
that tribal membership and inheritance rights with respect to land
descend only through the female line, on the other hand, is not so
repugnant to ordinary standards of fair play as to dictate its abolition
by the courts. 65 Moreover, to cite other examples in the field of
60. Citations supra note 12.
61. Supra note 11. The Supreme Court never has ruled that a right to counsel exists
in cases of petty offenses, the general axea of tribal court criminal jurisdiction.
62. 50 AM. JU. Statutes §§ 244, 429 (1944).
63. Although a serious question exists as to whether non-Indians come within a tribe's
jurisdiction as a matter of law, Congress obviously intended to establish "rights for all
Persons who may be subject to the jurisdiction of tribal governments, whether Indians or
non-Indians." SUMMARY IEPORT at 10. In view of the actual text of section 202(8), a sub-
sidiary question exists as to whether non-Indians are entitled to due process, or only to
the equal protection of the law.
64. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Avery
v. Midland County, 36 U.S.L.W. 4257 (April 2, 1968) ; but see Sailors v. Board of Educ.,
387 U.S. 105 (1967), and Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
65. In conferring civil jurisdiction over Indian reservations within that state upon the
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economic regulation, ample factual justification exists for sustain-
ing even as against a due process or equal protection attack the
right of a tribe to grant its members a preference in the allocation
of reservation grazing privileges or to assess a tax only upon non-
members doing business on the reservation.8
In the final analysis, though, how the courts will construe Title
II and, in particular, section 202(8) is a story yet to be told. Perhaps
the safest conclusion is that, over the years, the 1968 Civil Rights
Act will prove another landmark statute both in the protection of
individual Indian rights and in the progressive development of tribal
resources and institutions.
New York courts, Congress specifically recognized and gave effect to "those tribal laws
and customs which they [the Indians] desire to preserve . Act of September 13, 1950,
64 Stat. 845, 25 U.S.C. § 233 (1964).
66. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904): see Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Con-
necticut, 185 U.S. 364 (1902); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495
(1937) ; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
